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Abstract
Landsburg method of classifying mixed Nash equilibria for maximally en-
tangled Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens (ELW) game is analyzed with special em-
phasis on symmetries inherent to the problem. Nash equilibria for the original
ELW game are determined.
I Introduction
The papers of Eisert, Lewenstein and Wilkens (ELW) [1], [2] and Meyer [3] opened
new field of research - the theory of quantum games [4]÷[52]. Roughly speaking
this theory deals with the properties of the games obtained from classical ones
by admitting more general correlations, in particular those which break Bell-type
inequalities.
One of the most important notions of game theory is that of Nash equilibrium
[53]. The famous Nash theorem states that under quite general assumptions the
classical noncooperative game exhibits Nash equilibrium (or equilibria). Its validity
extends to quantum domain [22], [54].
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ELW game constructed in Ref. [1] provides a paradigm of quantum game. The
natural question arises concerning the description and classification of its Nash equi-
libria. The most interesting case seems to be that of maximal entanglement when
the initial state of the game is maximally entangled. In this case some examples of
Nash equilibria were presented in Ref. [2]. In a series of nice papers [24], [36]÷[39]
Landsburg described the general structure of possible, in general mixed, Nash equi-
libria for maximally entangled ELW games. His classification is slightly involved
because the problem is set in full generality, i.e. for arbitrary classical payoff matrix.
Using the isomorphism between the group SU(2) and the set of unit quaternions
one can reformulate the ELW game in terms of quaternion algebra. This formalism
takes a particularly simple form in the case of maximal entanglement and is exten-
sively used in Landsburg’s papers.
On the other hand it has been shown [43] that the maximally entangled ELW game
is also distinguished by the existence of the real structure in the Hilbert space of
the states of the game which fully determine its properties. Therefore, equivalently
the game can be analyzed in terms of geometry of real fourdimensional arithmetic
space.
In the present paper we classify all Nash equilibria for the original ELW game,
i.e. for the particular payoff matrix used in Ref. [1]. We follow Landsburg’s method
with some modifications and special emphasis put on symmetries inherent in the
problem. Landsburg analysis is based on two pillars. First, it is shown that any
mixed strategy is equivalent to the one supported on at most four orthogonal quater-
nions/real fourvectors; second, the analysis of possible mixed strategies reduces to
that of degeneracies of highest eigenvalues of the matrices determining the players
payoffs. These two principles when combined with the symmetries of the problem
give a very transparent picture.
The paper is organized as follows. I Sec. II we present the ELW game; then,
in Sec. III the quaternionic formalism is introduced. Symmetries of ELW games,
in particular their maximally entangled version, are discussed in Sec. IV. In the
next section the Nash equilibria are introduced and Landsburg method described in
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more detail. In Sec. VI the Nash equilibria of the original ELW game are classified.
II The Eisert-Lewenstein-Wilkens quantum games
(ELW games)
Eisert, Lewenstein and Wilkens [1], [2] proposed a quantization scheme of the sim-
plest classical symmetric noncooperative game involving two players, each having
two classical strategies at his/her disposal. Let us denote the players by A (Alice)
and B (Bob) while the relevant strategies are C (cooperate) and D (defect). The
classical game is completely determined by the payoff matrix
B
C D
A
C (X0, X0) (X2, X1)
D (X1, X2) (X3, X3)
(1)
whereXα’s are the relevant outcomes. We will be dealing with the games which obey
the conditions: (i) all Xα are distinct; (ii) all twofold sums Xα + Xβ are distinct
as well; such games are called generic in Landsburg terminology [24], [36]÷[39].
The properties of both classical and quantum games depend strongly on the actual
values of the outcomes. In particular, the ordering
X1 > X0 > X3 > X2 (2)
leads to the famous Prisoner Dilemma [55]. Depending on the context the additional
constraints can emerge. For example, one can add [19]
2X0 > X1 +X2 (3)
which implies that in the iterated game the players are at least as well of playing
always (C,C) or alternating between (C,D) and (D,C).
In order to construct the quantum counterpart of classical game we ascribe to
each player a twodimensional complex Hilbert space H ; the total space of the game
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is the tensor product H ⊗ H . The basic vectors in H correspond to two classical
strategies
|C〉 =
 1
0
 , |D〉 =
 0
1
 . (4)
The initial state of the game is given by
|Ψi〉 ≡ J (|C〉 ⊗ |C〉) (5)
where J is the gate operator which introduces the quantum entanglement leading
to quantum correlations breaking, in general, Bell-type inequalities. The form of J
is determined by two conditions
(i) the quantum game continues to be symmetric with respect to the exchange of
players;
(ii) the classical strategies are properly represented in the quantum game.
These conditions lead to the following form of gate operator [1]
J = exp
(
−iγ
2
σ2 ⊗ σ2
)
(6)
with γ ∈ 〈0, pi
2
〉
and σ2 being the Pauli matrix. One obtains a one parameter family
of gate operators. Quantum strategies of Alice and Bob are represented by unitary
matrices UA and UB belonging to SU(2). The final state of the game is defined as
|Ψf〉 = J+ (UA ⊗ UB)J (|C〉 ⊗ |C〉) (7)
and allows us to compute Alice and Bob payoffs
$A = X
0 |(〈C| ⊗ 〈C|) |Ψf〉|2 +X1 |(〈D| ⊗ 〈C|) |Ψf〉|2+
X2 |(〈C| ⊗ 〈D|) |Ψf〉|2 +X3 |(〈D| ⊗ 〈D|) |Ψf 〉|2
(8)
$B = X
0 |(〈C| ⊗ 〈C|) |Ψf〉|2 +X1 |(〈C| ⊗ 〈D|) |Ψf〉|2+
X2 |(〈D| ⊗ 〈C|) |Ψf〉|2 +X3 |(〈D| ⊗ 〈D|) |Ψf〉|2 .
(9)
The properties of the game depend on the choice of payoff matrix, the value of
the parameter γ and the choice of the manifold S ⊂ SU(2) of allowed strategies.
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In the original ELW paper S is some proper subset of SU(2) which itself is not a
group. It seems difficult to find a justification for the use of such set of strategies [8].
Therefore, in what follows we assume that S = SU(2), i.e. all elements of SU(2)
group are admissible as Alice and Bob strategies.
The value of γ is also significant. For γ = 0 we obtain the classical game. The
set of all pure quantum strategies coincides then with the set of all classical mixed
ones (some parameters of SU(2) group become redundant). On the other hand,
γ = pi
2
yields maximal entanglement of initial state; the properties of the game
change radically. For example, as we shall see, due to the Bell-like correlations, the
quantum game lacks nontrivial pure Nash equilibria.
The payoffs of the players depend on the actual values of Xα’s. However, some
outcomes coincide due to the purely group-theoretical reasons. To see this let us
define the stability subgroup Gs ⊂ SU(2)× SU(2) of the initial state:
g ∈ Gs ⇒ g |Ψi〉 = |Ψi〉 . (10)
Using eqs. (5) and (6) it is easy to determine Gs. We conclude that Gs depends on
the value of γ. For γ 6= pi
2
one obtains
Gs = U(1) (11)
and g ∈ Gs has the form
g = eiϕ
σ3
2 ⊗ e−iϕσ32 . (12)
In the case of maximal entanglement, γ = pi
2
, Gs becomes, up to an isomorphism,
the diagonal subgroup of SU(2)× SU(2). More precisely, any g ∈ Gs has the form
g =
(
U, U
)
, U ∈ SU(2) (13)
i.e. Gs ∼ SU(2).
Obviously, two pairs of strategies, (UA, UB) and (U
′
A, U
′
B), differing only by an ele-
ment of stability subgroup,
(UA, UB) = (U
′
A, U
′
B) · g (14)
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lead to the same outcome.
We see that the maximal entanglement corresponds to the largest stability
group. This fact has profound consequences for the structure of maximally en-
tangled game [52]. To see this note the identity in SU(2)× SU(2)
(UA, UB) =
(
UAU
T
B , I
) · (UB, UB) . (15)
Comparying eqs. (15) and (14) we conclude that the outcomes of both players
depend only on the product UAU
T
B .
III The quaternionic formalism
It is well known that the SU(2) group is isomorphic to the group of unit quaternions.
It is, therefore, not surprising that one can formulate the ELW scheme in terms of
quaternion algebra.
Let us remind shortly the notion of quaternions. One considers the fourdimen-
sional real vector space spanned by the vectors eα, α = 0, 1, 2, 3 which may be take
as orthonormal ones, (eα, eβ) = δα,β. The multiplication law is defined as follows
e0 = 1, e
2
i = −1, eiej = εijkek, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3 (16)
extended by linearity to any pair of vectors.
Putting
p = pαeα, q = qαeα (17)
(summation over α understood) one easily finds
(pq)0 = p0q0 − piqi
(pq)i = p0qi + q0pi + εijkpjqk
(18)
(summations over latin indices run from 1 to 3). Quaternions form a noncommuta-
tive field with conjugation
p ≡ p0e0 − piei (19)
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and quaternionic norm |p|:
|p|2 e0 = pp =
(
3∑
α=0
p2α
)
e0. (20)
The quaternion is called a unit one iff |p| = 1.
Any matrix U ∈ SU(2) can be written as
U = p01− ipkσk, p20 +
3∑
k=1
p2k = 1. (21)
The mapping
U ←→ p = pαeα (22)
defines the group isomorphism. In particular, ek ↔ −iσk, k = 1, 2, 3 while e0 is
2× 2 unit matrix.
Let us consider an ELW game defined by some parameter γ ∈ 〈0, pi
2
〉
. Using the
isomorphism (22) one can ascribe the quaternions p and q to the strategies of Alice
and Bob, respectively,
UA ←→ p = pαeα (23)
UB ←→ q = qαeα. (24)
The gate operator J , defined by eq. (6) takes the following quaternionic form
J = cos
(γ
2
)
e0 ⊗ e0 + i sin
(γ
2
)
e2 ⊗ e2. (25)
Finally, note that if we put
U ←→ r = rαeα (26)
then, according to the definitions (4)
〈C|U |C〉 = r0 − ir3 (27)
〈D|U |C〉 = −ir1 + r2. (28)
Eqs. (8), (9) and (23)÷(28) allow us to write the expected payoffs of Alice and Bob
in terms of quaternions. This construction does not seem to be very useful except
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the case of maximal entanglement, γ = pi
2
. In the latter case the quaternionic form
may be described as follows. Let
UA =
 a b
−b a
 |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 (29)
UB =
 α β
−β α
 |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 (30)
be the strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively. The Alice strategy is represented
by the quaternion
p = Rea e0 − Imb e1 − Reb e2 − Ima e3 (31)
which corresponds to the isomorphism (22). On the other case, the quaternion
corresponding to Bob strategy reads
q = Reα e0 + Reβ e1 + Imβ e2 + Imα e3. (32)
This correspondence defines an isomorphism between SU(2) and unit quaternions
such that
e1 ←→ iσ2, e2 ←→ iσ1, e3 ←→ iσ3. (33)
Using the above definitions it is not difficult to check that the payoff functions $A
and $B (eqs. (8) and (9)) take the form
$A (p, q) = X0
(
pq−1
)2
0
+X1
(
pq−1
)2
1
+X2
(
pq−1
)2
2
+X3
(
pq−1
)2
3
≡
≡
3∑
α=0
Xα
(
pq−1
)2
α
(34)
$B (p, q) = X0
(
pq−1
)2
0
+X2
(
pq−1
)2
1
+X1
(
pq−1
)2
2
+X3
(
pq−1
)2
3
≡
≡
3∑
α=0
X˜α
(
pq−1
)2
α
(35)
with X˜0,3 = X0,3, X˜1,2 = X2,1.
We see that the payoff functions take a particularly simple form in quaternionic
formalism. As expected, due to the large stability group the payoffs depend only
on the product pq−1. In what follows we make the replacement q−1 → q which
simplifies eqs. (34) and (35) and amounts only to relabelling the Bob strategies.
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IV Symmetries of ELW games
The ELW games exhibit a number of symmetries which appear to be more or less
useful when considering their specific properties. First, the structure of the game
(for example, the set of Nash equilibria) does not change, except the actual values
of the payoffs, if one makes the substitution
Xα → λXα + µ, µ ∈ R, λ ∈ R+. (36)
Assume now that we are dealing with maximally entangled game. Let r be any unit
quaternion. Then eqs. (34) and (35) imply (with q replaced by q−1 as explained
above)
$A,B (p, q) = $A,B
(
pr−1, rq
)
. (37)
In particular,
$A,B (p, q) = $A,B (1, pq) = $A,B (pq,1) . (38)
This property results, as it has been explained above, from the structure of stability
group in maximally entangled case.
Another symmetry property is related to the specific geometry of quaternions
[36]. It is well known that for unit quaternions p and q the transformation
r → prq−1 (39)
describes SO(4) rotation of a four-vector r; in fact, eq. (39) defines the local
isomorphism SU(2)× SU(2) ∼ SO(4). Let σ ∈ S4 be any permutation of 0, 1, 2, 3.
Then one can always adjust the signs ± of eσ−1(α) such that
± eσ−1(α) = p1eαq−11 (40)
for some unit quaternions p1 and q1.
Therefore, for any quaternion r
p1rq
−1
1 =
(±rσ(α)) eα. (41)
As a result one can rewrite the expected payoff of (say) Alice as
$A =
3∑
α=0
Xα (pq)
2
α =
3∑
α=0
Xα
(
p−11 pqq1
)2
σ(α)
(42)
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and the same holds true for the Bob payoff $B. We conclude that by permuting
the components (pq−1)
2
α in eqs. (34) and (35) we obtain the equivalent games; they
differ only from the initial one by relabelling the strategies only.
Both classical and quantum games are symmetric with respect to the exchange
of players. This symmetry is described on the quaternionic level as follows. Let
r ≡ 1√
2
(e0 + e3) ; (43)
then
re0r
−1 = e0, re1r
−1 = e2, re2r
−1 = −e1, re3r−1 = e3. (44)
Noting that (pq)2α = (pq)
2
α = (q · p)2α one finds
$A (p, q) ≡ $ (p, q) (45)
$B (p, q) = $
(
r q r−1, r p r−1
)
(46)
which expresses the symmetric role of both players.
V Mixed strategies and Nash equilibria
The set of all pure strategies of each player consists of unit quaternions, i.e. it forms
the unit threedimensional sphere S3. Therefore, a mixed strategy is represented by
a normalized nonnegative measure µ on S3. In general, both players are playing
mixed strategies. Then the expected payoffs read
$A (µ, ν) =
∫∫
S3×S3
$A (p, q) dµ (p) dν (q) (47)
$B (µ, ν) =
∫∫
S3×S3
$B (p, q) dµ (p) dν (q) . (48)
One of the most important notions in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium. Let
us remind that a pair of strategies (µ0, ν0) defines a Nash equilibrium iff
$A (µ0, ν0) ≥ $A (µ, ν0) (49)
10
$B (µ0, ν0) ≥ $B (µ0, ν) (50)
for all strategies µ and ν.
The problem of finding and classifying all Nash equilibria for general ELW game
is nontrivial. The most interesting case seems to be the one corresponding to the
maximally entangled game where the role of quntum correlations is the most sig-
nificant. On the other hand the problem simplifies then due to the large symmetry
of the game. In a series of papers [24], [36]÷[39], Landsburg was able to classify
all potential candidates for Nash equilibria. Their general description is still quite
involved but the underlying basic ideas are nice and transparent. In fact, there are
two basic steps to be performed. First, one has to find the ”canonical” form of
mixed strategy. To this end we start with the following definitions. We call two
measures on S3, ν and ν
′, left equivalent iff∫
S3
(pq)2α dν (q) =
∫
S3
(pq)2α dν
′ (q) (51)
for any unit quaternion (and, consequently, for any quaternion) p and α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Analogously, two measures, µ and µ′, are right equivalent iff∫
S3
(pq)2α dµ (p) =
∫
S3
(pq)2α dµ
′ (p) (52)
for any unit quaternion q and α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
It easy to classify all measures up to equivalence. To see this let us write
(pq)α = mαβ (p) qβ. (53)
The matrix m (p) is orthogonal (if fact, m (p) ∈ SO(4) because p → 1 · p · q is an
SO(4) transformation).
m (p)mT (p) = I (54)
It is easy to write out m (p) explicitly,
m (p) =

p0 −p1 −p2 −p3
p1 p0 −p3 p2
p2 p3 p0 −p1
p3 −p2 p1 p0
 . (55)
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Eq. (53) implies now∫
S3
(pq)2α dν (q) = mαβ(p)mαγ(p)
∫
S3
qβqγdν(q) (56)
(no summation over α). The matrix
Sαβ ≡
∫
qαqβdν(q) (57)
is (a) real and symmetric; (b) positive semidefinite; (c) of unit trace. Therefore,
it can be diagonalized by a real orthogonal transformation. In operator language,
S =
4∑
a=1
ρa
∣∣q(a)〉 〈q(a)∣∣, ρa ≥ 0, 4∑
a=1
ρa = 1. Explicitly
Sαβ =
4∑
a=1
ρaq
(a)
α q
(a)
β (58)
and q(a) are orthonormal. Let us note that the representation (58) is not unique.
If some eigenvalue ρa is d-fold degenerate one can replace the corresponding eigen-
vectors q(a1), q(a2), . . . , q(ad) by their arbitrary O(d) combinations. In particular, if
all ρa are nondegenerate we are left with sign arbitrariness, q
(a) → ±q(a). Then eq.
(56) takes the form∫
S3
(pq)2α dν(q) =
4∑
a=1
ρamαβ (p)mαγ (p)
∫
q
(a)
β q
(a)
γ dν(q) =
4∑
a=1
ρa
∫ (
pq(a)
)2
α
dν(q).
(59)
Eq. (59) shows that any measure ν is left equivalent to the one supported on at
most four orthonormal quaternions [24]. The same holds true for right equivalence.
From the above definitions it is obvious that in computing the payoffs $A and
$B one can replace Alice (Bob) measure by right (left) equivalent one. We conclude
that the payoff functions can be always written in the form
$A,B (µ, ν) =
4∑
a,b=1
σaρb$A,B
(
p(a), q(b)
)
(60)
with ρa ≥ 0, σa ≥ 0,
4∑
a=1
ρa =
4∑
a=1
σa = 1. Now, in order to classify all Nash
equilibria we have to find all sets
(
σa, p
(a)
)
and
(
ρb, q
(b)
)
such that $A as a function
12
of first strategy maximizes on
(
σa, p
(a)
)
while $B as a function of second strategy
maximizes on
(
ρb, q
(b)
)
. Let Λ ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of indices a such that σa > 0.
Then $A (µ, ν) is a convex combination of the quantities
4∑
b=1
ρb$A
(
p(a), q(b)
)
. Such
a convex combination acquires a maximal value iff these quantities take the same
(maximal) value for all a ∈ Λ. Consider now the payoff
$A (p, ν) ≡
4∑
b=1
ρb$A
(
p, q(b)
)
. (61)
It is a quadratic form in p. Therefore, it takes the maximal values for p belonging
to the eigenspace of the relevant quadratic matrix which corresponds to maximal
eigenvalue. We conclude that the vectors p(a), a ∈ Λ, span this eigenspace; in other
words, the highest eigenvalue has |Λ|-fold degeneracy.
Similarly, let Σ ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of inidces b such that ρb > 0. Then the
eigenspace of the matrix defined by the quadratic form in q
$B (µ, q) =
4∑
a=1
σa$B
(
p(a), q
)
(62)
which corresponds to the maximal eigenvalue is spanned by the vectors q(b), b ∈ Σ.
Concluding, the search for Nash equilibria reduces to the problem of finding
two sets µ =
{
σa, p
(a)
}
and ν =
{
ρb, q
(b)
}
such that p(a), a ∈ Λ span the maximal
eigenspace of the quadratic form $A (p, ν), eq. (61), while q
(b), b ∈ Σ span the
maximal eigenspace of quadratic form $B (µ, q), eq. (62).
The pair
{{
σa, p
(a)
}
,
{
ρb, q
(b)
}}
is called a Nash equilibrium of the (M,N) type
if |Λ| = M , |Σ| = N (cf. [36]); obviously, 1 ≤ M,N ≤ 4 and, due to the symmetry
of the game, we can assume M ≥ N .
VI Nash equilibria for the original ELW game
We will classify now the Nash equilibria for the original ELW game [1] which cor-
responds to X0 = 3, X1 = 5, X2 = 0, X3 = 1.
Let us start with N = 1 case, i.e. the case Bob plays pure strategy. Due to the
symmetry p→ pr, q → r−1q one can assume Bob symmetry corresponds to q = 1.
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Then
$A =
4∑
a=1
ρa
3∑
α=0
Xα
(
p(a)
)2
α
. (63)
Note that ρa
(
p(a)
)2
α
≥ 0,
4∑
a=1
3∑
α=0
ρa
(
p(a)
)2
α
= 1. Therefore, the maximum of $A is
achieved for ρa = 1 for some a, say a = 1, and p
(1) = ±e1. Then $A = 5 and Alice
plays pure strategy p = e1. Consequently,
$B (±e1, q) =
3∑
α=0
X˜α (e1q)
2
α (64)
and the maximum is achieved for e1q = ±e2, i.e. q = ±e3 6= e0; no Nash equilibrium
exists.
Assume now N=2. Due to our symmetry one can assume q(1) = 1= e0, q
(2) = q,
q = q1e1 + q2e2 + q3e3, q
2 = −e0. Denote ρ1 = ρ, ρ2 = 1− ρ, 0 < ρ < 1. We find
$A (p, ν) = ρ
3∑
α=0
Xαp
2
α + (1− ρ)
3∑
α=0
(pq)2α . (65)
Let X = diag (X0, X1, X2, X3); moreover, we put (cf. eq. (53))
(pq)α ≡ m˜αβ (q) pβ. (66)
Then
m˜ (q) =

q0 −q1 −q2 −q3
q1 q0 q3 −q2
q2 −q3 q0 q1
q3 q2 −q1 q0
 ; (67)
q2 = −e0, i.e. q0 = 0, implies m˜T (q) = −m˜ (q) and m˜2 (q) = −I. Eq. (65) can be
rewritten as
$A (p, ν) = p
T
(
ρX + (1− ρ) m˜T (q)Xm˜ (q)) p. (68)
According to the discussion of previous Section the matrix
Y (q, ρ,X) ≡ ρX + (1− ρ) m˜T (q)Xm˜ (q) (69)
posseses M-fold (M ≥ 2) degenerate highest eigenvalue.
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Y (q, ρ,X) is a real symmetric matrix; explicitly
Y (q, ρ,X) =

Y0 (1− ρ)X32q2q3 (1− ρ)X13q1q3 (1− ρ)X21q1q2
(1− ρ)X32q2q3 Y1 (1− ρ)X03q1q2 (1− ρ)X02q1q3
(1− ρ)X13q1q3 (1− ρ)X03q1q2 Y2 (1− ρ)X01q2q3
(1− ρ)X21q1q2 (1− ρ)X02q1q3 (1− ρ)X01q2q3 Y3

(70)
where Xαβ ≡ Xα −Xβ and
Y0 = ρX0 + (1− ρ)
(
X1q
2
1 +X2q
2
2 +X3q
2
3
)
(71)
Y1 = ρX1 + (1− ρ)
(
X0q
2
1 +X2q
2
3 +X3q
2
2
)
(72)
Y2 = ρX2 + (1− ρ)
(
X0q
2
2 +X1q
2
3 +X3q
2
1
)
(73)
Y3 = ρX3 + (1− ρ)
(
X0q
2
3 +X1q
2
2 +X2q
2
1
)
. (74)
Assume first that only one component of q is nonzero. Then the matrix Y (q, ρ,X)
is diagonal
Y (q, ρ,X) =

ρX0 + (1− ρ)X3 0 0 0
0 ρX1 + (1− ρ)X2 0 0
0 0 ρX2 + (1− ρ)X1 0
0 0 0 ρX3 + (1− ρ)X0
 .
(75)
Using the actual values of the payoffs Xα we find easily that the highest eigenvalue
is degenerated only provided ρ = 1
2
. Then the eigenspace corresponding to the
maximal eigenvalues is spanned by e1 and e2. Therefore, according to the general
discussion presented above, Alice plays the strategies
p(1) = e1 cos θ + e2 sin θ
p(2) = −e1 sin θ + e2 cos θ
(76)
with the probabilities σ and (1− σ), respectively. Then the quadratic matrix defin-
ing the Bob payoff reads
Z (p, σ, X) =


Z0 0 0 (2σ − 1) cs
(
X˜1 − X˜2
)
0 Z1 (2σ − 1) cs
(
X˜0 − X˜3
)
0
0 (2σ − 1) cs
(
X˜0 − X˜3
)
Z2 0
(2σ − 1) cs
(
X˜1 − X˜2
)
0 0 Z3


(77)
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where c ≡ cos θ, s ≡ sin θ and
Z0 = X˜1
(
s2 + σ
(
c2 − s2))+ X˜2 (c2 − σ (c2 − s2)) (78)
Z1 = X˜0
(
s2 + σ
(
c2 − s2))+ X˜3 (c2 − σ (c2 − s2)) (79)
Z2 = X˜0
(
c2 − σ (c2 − s2))+ X˜3 (s2 + σ (c2 − s2)) (80)
Z3 = X˜1
(
c2 − σ (c2 − s2))+ X˜2 (s2 + σ (c2 − s2)) . (81)
Now, q = e0 should be an eigenvector corresponding to the highest eigenvalue. This
implies
(2σ − 1) cos θ sin θ = 0. (82)
If σ = 1
2
we find double degeneracy of highest eigenvalue corresponding to q(1) = e0,
q(3) = ±e3. Therefore, we find the whole family of Nash equilibria parametrized by
an angle θ:
Alice:
The strategies
p(1) = e1 cos θ + e2 sin θ
p(2) = −e1 sin θ + e2 cos θ
(83)
played with the probabilities 1
2
;
Bob:
The strategies
q(1) = e0
q(2) = ±e3
(84)
played with the probabilities 1
2
.
Let us note that both the sign arbitrariness and the arbitrary value of the θ angle are
the consequences of the O(d) (d = 2) symmetry present in the case of degeneracy.
The second solution to the equation (82) reads
cos θ sin θ = 0. (85)
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Using actual values of X˜ ′αwe find easily from eqs. (78)÷(81) that Z has degenerate
highest eigenvalue only provided σ = 1
2
and the second eigenvector corresponding
to this eigenvalue is q = ±e3.
Summarizing, we have found that, if N = 2 and we assume that the vector q
entering eqs. (68) and (69) has only one nonvanishing component the only set of
Nash equilibria is given by eqs. (83) and (84).
The case N = 2 with at least two nonvanishing components of q is more involved.
let T (α) ⊂ R4 be the subspace defined by the relations
v ∈ T (α) iff vα = 0, (Y (q, ρ,X) v)α = 0 (86)
where the matrix Y (q, ρ,X) is given by eq. (70). Under our assumption concerning
q the spaces T (α) are twodimensional for α = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Defining
u(0) =

0
q1
q2
q3
 , v
(0) =

0
X1q1
X2q2
X3q3
 (87)
u(1) =

q1
0
q3
−q2
 , v
(1) =

X0q1
0
X2q3
−X3q2
 (88)
u(2) =

q2
−q3
0
q1
 , v
(2) =

X0q2
−X1q3
0
X3q1
 (89)
u(3) =

q3
q2
−q1
0
 , v
(3) =

X0q3
X1q2
−X2q1
0
 (90)
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we easily find that u(α), v(α) ∈ T (α); moreover, u(α) and v(α) span T (α). Assume
that the highest eigenvalue of Y (q, ρ,X) is at least doubly degenerated. Then there
exists an eigenvector w of Y (q, ρ,X) which obeys (say) w0 = 0,
Y w = λw (91)
Eq. (91) implies that w ∈ T (0). By virtue of this one can write
w = au(0) + bv(0), a, b ∈ R (92)
Inserting the general form of w, as given by eq. (92) into eq. (91) we find, using
MATHEMATICA, that eq. (91) is fulfiled if either (a) q1 = 0 or q2 = 0 or (b)
ρ = 1
2
.
Consider the case (a). Let us first assume that q1 = 0. The matrix Y (q, ρ,X)
simplifies considerably; only two nondiagonal elements are nonvanishing. Y (q, ρ,X)
can be diagonalized explicitly (the best way is to use MATHEMATICA). Imposing
the condition that the largest eigenvalue of Y (q, ρ,X) is doubly degenerate we find
q2 nad q3 as the functions of ρ. It appears that for ρ =
1
2
we recover our old solution
(83), (84). For ρ 6= 1
2
there is a one parameter family of solutions q2 = q2(ρ),
q3 = q3(ρ); 0 ≤ q22 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q23 ≤ 1 imply 13 ≤ ρ ≤ 23 . Denoting again by p˜(1) and
p˜(2) the eigenvectors of Y (q, ρ,X) corresponding to the largest eigenvalue we find
that the Alice strategy is
p(1) = p˜(1) cos θ + p˜(2) sin θ
p(2) = −p˜(1) sin θ + p˜(2) cos θ
(93)
played with the probabilities σ and (1− σ), respectively. Now, we demand that
the Bob payoff maximizes on e0 and q. There are three free parameters to be
determined: θ, σ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ 〈1
3
, 2
3
〉
(ρ 6= 1
2
). Straightforward computations
with the help of MATHEMATICA shows that no solutions exists. Similar reasoning
shows that there is no solution also if q2 = 0.
Let us now consider the case (b), ρ = 1
2
. The matrix Y reads then (cf. eq. (69))
Y
(
q,
1
2
, X
)
=
1
2
(X − m˜(q)Xm˜(q).) (94)
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Note that then
Y
(
q,
1
2
, X
)
m˜ (q) = m˜ (q)Y
(
q,
1
2
, X
)
. (95)
Therefore, if v is an eigenvector of Y then m˜(q)v is also an eigenvector corresponding
to the same eigenvalue. Moreover, due to the antisymmetry of m˜(q), m˜(q)v is
orthogonal to v (and nonvanishing as m˜2(q) = −I). So the eigenvalues of Y are
doubly degenerated. There are two possibilities: either all four eigenvalues are equal
or there are two eigenvalues, λ1 > λ2, each doubly degenerate. In the first case
Y = λI and at least two component of q must vanish contrary to our assumption.
We conclude that Y
(
q, 1
2
, X
)
has two doubly degenerated eigenvalues for any q
under consideration. Therefore, M = 2; exchanging the players and making use of
the symmetry of the game we conclude the previous arguments, applied now to Alice
strategy, imply σ = 1
2
. Alice plays using, with the same probability, two orthogonal
strategies p(1) and p(2) which are the eigenvectors of Y
(
q, 1
2
, X
)
corresponding to
the highest eigenvalue. Again, by virtue of eq. (95) m˜(q)p(1) is a unit eigenvector
of Y
(
q, 1
2
, X
)
orthogonal to p(1) so we have
p(2) = ±m˜ (q) p(1). (96)
The quadratic matrix corresponding to the Bob payoff can be written in the form
Z
(
p,
1
2
, X˜
)
= mT
(
p(1)
)
X˜m
(
p(1)
)
+mT
(
p(2)
)
X˜m
(
p(2)
)
(97)
or, using eq. (96)
Z
(
p,
1
2
, X˜
)
= mT
(
p(1)
)
X˜m
(
p(1)
)
+mT (q)mT
(
p(1)
)
X˜m
(
p(1)
)
m(q). (98)
We see that, in analogy to eq. (95)
Z
(
p,
1
2
, X˜
)
m(q) = m(q)Z
(
p,
1
2
, X˜
)
. (99)
Now, e0 must be the eigenvector of Z corresponding to the highest eigenvalue. By
virtue of eq. q = m(q)e0 (99) q is automatically also such an eigenvector. We
conclude that in order to find the Nash equilibrium for general q one has to select
some eigenvector p(1), corresponding to highest eigenvalue of Y
(
q, 1
2
, X
)
and to
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define p(2) by eq. (96). Then one should check if e0 is an eigenvector of Z
(
p, 1
2
, X˜
)
given by eq. (98), again corresponding to its highest eigenvalue. Let us note that
the O(2) symmetry due to ρ = 1
2
allow us to select p(1) in such a way that one of
its component (for example, p
(1)
0 ) vanishes. It is not difficult to check then using
MATHEMATICA that no solution exists unless two components of q vanish. This
completes the case M = N = 2.
Let us note that the cases N = 2, M = 3, 4 can solved quite easily. If M = 3
the maximal eigenvalue of Y (q, ρ,X) has a triple degeneracy. Then one can choose
at least two linearly independent eigenvectors w(1), w(2) belonging to (say) T (0). So
they span T (0) and, consequently, u(0) and v(0) (cf. eq. (87)) are eigenvectors of
y (q, ρ,X). It is easy to check that it is impossible for generic q. The case M = 4
yields Y (q, ρ,X) = λI which implies that only one component of q is nonvanishing.
Finally, consider the case N ≥ 3. One can again write out the relevant matri-
ces Y and Z and derive the conditions to be fulfield in order they posses at least
threefold degenerate maximal highest eigenvalues. However, it is more convenient
to use directly the results derived by Landsburg [37] which take particularly sim-
ple form when M ≥ N ≥ 3. Namely, there are two possibilities: either (i) each
players strategy is supported on three of the four strategies ±e0, ±e1, ±e2, ±e3 or
(ii) each player plays each of four orthogonal quaternions with probability 1
4
. It is
straightforward to check that for the actual values of payoffs Xα the case (i) leads
to no Nash equilibria. As far as (ii) is concerned, the O(4) degeneracy allows us to
assume that both player play strategies supported on e0, e1, e2 and e3. Again no
Nash equilibrium is attained.
VII Explicit form of Nash equilibria
The following conclusion follows from the results derived in previous sections. All
Nash equilibria for the original maximally entangled ELW game are obtained from
the following strategies of Alice and Bob
Alice:
20
e1 and e2 played with equal probabilities
Bob:
e0 and e3 played with equal probabilities,
by applying the following operations:
(i) O(2) transformations on (e1, e2) and (e0, e3)
(ii) symmetry transformations p → pr, q → r−1q with r being an arbitrary unit
quaternion.
As a result we obtain the following family of strategies:
Alice:
(e1 cos θA + e2 sin θA) r, ± (−e1 sin θA + e2 cos θA) r
played with equal probabilities
Bob:
r−1 (e0 cos θB + e3 sin θB), ±r−1 (−e0 sin θB + e3 cos θB)
played with equal probabilities.
One can get rid of θB dependence by factorizing an arbitrary r as r(θB) · r with
r(θB) = e0 cos θB + e3 sin θB. (100)
Finally, we arrive at the following form of strategies:
Alice:
(e1 cos θ + e2 sin θ) r, ± (−e1 sin θ + e2 cos θ) r
Bob:
r−1e0, ±r−1e3
21
played with equal probabilities.
Let us translate our result back to the language of SU(2) matrices. Taking into
account eqs. (31) and (32) and keeping in mind that we have made the replacement
Q→ q−1 we find the following form of Nash strategies:
Alice:
U
(1)
A =
 −βe−iθ −iαe−iθ
−iαeiθ −βeiθ
 , U (2)A =
 iβe−iθ −αe−iθ
αeiθ −iβeiθ
 (101)
Bob:
U
(1)
B =
 α β
−β α
 , U (2)B =
 −iα −iβ
−iβ iα
 (102)
all strategies being played with probability 1
2
.
Let us note that the substitution
α′ = −βe−iθ
β ′ = −iαe−iθ
θ′ = pi − θ
(103)
exchanges the roles of Alice and Bob. Puting α = 0, β = 1 and θ = pi yields the
Nash equilibrium considered in Ref. [2].
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